received more than 143,000 letters and more than 100 phone calls a day. This level of input uncovered for commissioners every possible argument that could be proffered on behalf of potentially impacted bases.- 2 In spite of public sensitivities, the Defense Department, Congress and the President reached the decision to close 35 installations and realign another 42.
How did they do it without committing political suicide? It's an interesting story. The Defense De artment's ability to further streamline its base structure came to a sudden stop. Congress finally had gained control.
Six years later 9 The President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control-- During Phase I the group arranged bases into seven mission categories:
To determine "Military Value" relative to the total Army the group assigned and weighted measureable attributes drawn from DoD's priority selection criteria and criterion number seven-
Attributes Weight

Mission essentiality 250
Mission suitability 250
Operational efficiencies 150 The MACOMs expanded each of these with their own lists of quantifiable attributes--approved by the TABS group--each weighted in order to compare similar bases in an unbiased manner.
In Phase l1 the TABS group conducted its analysis. Members examined each mission category to identify the Army's excess base capacity. After dropping from consideration bases with high military value, unique missions, those unaffected by the planned force structure changes and those where data was insufficient to make a sound decision, the group identified 24 mission bases and 39 under the Corps of Engineers as candidates for closure or realignment.
Finally it evaluated each of these with respect to the remaining three selection critena--return on investment, economic impact on communities and the environmental impact. The results, after review by the senior advisors, were sent to the Secretary.
The Secretary of the Army approved and forwarded to OSD a list of 18 Army installations recommended for closure or realignment. 24 Department of the Navy
The Department of the Navy--which oversees both the Navy and Marine The Committee planned to use data collected during an earlier basing study as its starting point. By May, however, it reported to the General Accounting Office (GAO) "that much of the data were biased in favor of keeping bases open ---and were (therefore) inadequate for an objective assessment of the Navy's basing needs.26 As a result, the committee chose to rely heavily on hearings with senior officials representing both Navy and Marine Corps.
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For analysis the Committee grouped facilities into 23 Navy and six Marine categories according to missions, capabilities and specific attributes.
Members then analyzed each category looking for excess base capacity. Their study considered factors such as relative criticality, projected deployment schedules, planning criteria, unique attributes, data from existing data bases, compatible use zones, airspace congestion and explosive safety. When the analysis was complete eight of the original 29 categories were identified for further study, seven Navy one Marine.
The Committee next considered DoD's four priority selection criteria and subjectively assigned each base a green, yellow or red color code to reflect its relative military value. Green bases had the highest military value, red the least. Green bases were excluded from further consideration as were those facilities having strategic importance, exceptional operational value or some unique aspect.
With the field further narrowed, the Committee conducted a computer assisted cost-benefit analysis and examined the potential impacts on local economies ano the environment. The Executive Group analyzed the bases within each category for both excess capacity and mission essentiality. As a result all but 51 facilities were withdrawn from further analysis.
Unlike the Army and Navy, the Air Force's first cut at its candidate bases 
'Military
Value" but when color codes were assigned four of them were judged yellow and two green. Additionally, when GAO ran its own analysis of ship berthing capacity, it determined that significant excess capacity would still exist even if all the Navy's recommendations were adoptedkl Unlike the Army and Air Force, the Navy did not comply with the directed requirement of having an internal control plan.
Both the Air Force and Army considered the economic and environmental impact of potential closures as an integral part of the decision making processes. The Navy, however, did not consider these until after the proposed criteria were decided.
Congress was unwilling to accept the Administration's unilateral base closure actior, 3 , jet as a body it appeared politically impotent to address the Issue. Congress wanted control over the process but without exercising it directly. Accordingly, it adopted a hands-off approach so as not to put any particular member in jeopardy. Members devised a plan to retain authority without accountability, a plan to approve closures by simply not disapproving them! For Congress was this political cowardice or political genius? Arguably, it was a little of both.
In retrospect, it seems possible (if not probable) that the Defense Base
